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 OFF-FARM WORK DECISIONS OF HUSBANDS AND
 WIVES: JOINT DECISION MAKING
 Wallace E. Huffman and Mark D. Lange*
 Abstract-Theoretical and econometric models are developed
 to examine joint wage-labor participation and hours decisions
 of a husband and wife in farm households. The econometric
 model is multiple equation and recursive. The specification of
 the off-farm labor supply equation of the husband (wife)
 depends on whether his (her) wife (husband) does or does not
 work off-farm, and this structure is endogenous. The model is
 fitted to data for Iowa farm households. The main conclusion
 is that the off-farm labor supply equation of a married individ-
 ual differs significantly depending on whether his or her spouse
 also works for a wage.
 I. Introduction
 TE ARLIER econometric studies of off-farm
 i2f labor supply decisions of U.S. farmers
 (Huffman, 1980; Sumner, 1982) failed to consider
 the implications of non-negativity constraints on
 off-farm hours. Each time that a binding non-
 negativity constraint is encountered (e.g., the
 spouse does not work off-farm), the economic
 structure-some of the variables to be included
 and all the coefficients-of household decision
 functions are changed.
 The objective of this paper is to propose and fit
 a recursive multiple equation econometric model
 of joint decisions for off-farm work of a husband
 and wife in farm households where endogenous
 switching of the econometric structure occurs
 whenever binding non-negativity constraints oc-
 cur. The econometric model, which is adapted to
 take account of several serious problems that arise
 in implementing this procedure, is fitted to data
 for Iowa farm households. The main conclusion is
 that the off-farm labor-supply equations differ sig-
 nificantly depending on whether the spouse also
 works off-farm.
 The paper has the following organization. Sec-
 tion II presents a model of time allocation where
 binding non-negativity constraints can occur. In
 section III, an econometric model of these deci-
 sions is described. Section IV presents the empiri-
 cal results, and the final section presents a few
 implications.
 II. A Model of Time Allocation
 The labor-supply decisions of husbands and
 wives in farm households are derived from a be-
 havioral model that permits self-employment on
 their farms and wage work off-farm. For similar
 models, see Huffman (1980), Rosenzweig (1980),
 Sumner (1982), and Strauss (1986). The decision
 unit is a single-family farm household, and to
 simplify the analysis, the time allocations of only
 the husband (M) and wife (F) are considered.
 Husband's and wife's time are assumed to be
 heterogeneous. They receive an endowment of time
 each year (T), which the household allocates
 among work on their farm (Tf), work off their
 farm (Tm), and to home time (Th):
 T= T? + Tm + T,, TM, > 0; i =M, F. (1)
 Optimal hours of off-farm work may be zero in
 any year. The modeling takes explicit account of
 these inequality constraints on hours of wage work,
 which are important for proper empirical specifi-
 cations of off-farm labor-supply functions.
 The husband and wife work to obtain income
 for spending on consumption goods. The farm
 household is competitive in output and input mar-
 kets and receives cash income from net farm in-
 come (PqQ - WX), other household income (V),
 and possibly, income from off-farm wage work
 (WMTg' + WFTF). Cash income is spent on con-
 sumption goods (Y):
 WMTM~ + WFT + pqQ _ WX + V = PIY
 (2)
 where Pq is the price of farm output (Q), WX is
 the outlay on purchased farm inputs, and P, is the
 price of Y. The off-farm wage rate net of commut-
 ing cost is W' = W'(T), where T represents dis-
 tance to off-farm jobs. More generally, commuting
 Received for publication October 27, 1986. Revision accepted
 for publication October 3, 1988.
 * Iowa State University and Louisiana State University, re-
 spectively.
 Helpful comments on earlier drafts were obtained from
 Robert Emerson, John Strauss, Paul Schultz, Peter Orazem,
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 expenses to off-farm work depend on the amount
 (days) of off-farm work.
 The off-farm labor-demand or wage-offer equa-
 tions facing husbands and wives are assumed to
 depend on their respective marketable human cap-
 ital (Fi) and local labor market characteristics
 (in) but are assumed to be independent of their
 current hours of work. The market labor demand
 or off-farm wage functions are summarized in
 vector form as:
 Wi(T) = W'(Ei, )(3)
 The expectation is that increasing marketable hu-
 man skills (e.g., formal schooling, vocational train-
 ing, and experience) shifts upward the labor de-
 mand curve. Restrictive land rental and ownership
 opportunities are expected to reduce labor mobil-
 ity in rural labor markets and to affect wage offers.
 The farm business is assumed to produce and
 sell farm output (Q). Variable inputs in farm
 production are husband's and wife's farm labor
 (T1M 77) and purchased inputs (X), including
 labor hired from other households. Farm family
 and hired farm labor are assumed to be heteroge-
 neous because of different entrepreneurial skills
 and incentives to work. The efficiency of farm
 production depends on human capital of the hus-
 band and wife (EM, EF) and on other farm-
 specific characteristics (4); e.g., climate. The tech-
 nology of farm production is represented by the
 concave production function:
 Q = Q(T TM [F X; EM, EF, F) (4)
 The production function (4) is substituted into the
 income constraint (2) to obtain a new cash income
 constraint:
 WMTM + WFTmF
 +PQ (TM TJF X; 4, EM, F)
 -WX+ V-PYY=O. (5)
 Household utility is assumed to depend on the
 inputs of home time of the husband and wife
 (ThM, ThF) and of goods purchased for direct or
 indirect consumption (Y):
 U = U(ThM, Th, Y; Em, E F, r)
 dU/dQ>O, d2U/dQ2 < ,
 Q2 = Th ,Th (6)
 Household utility also depends on husband's and
 wife's human capital (EM, E F) because of effi-
 ciency or taste effects and other household charac-
 teristics (F) (e.g., number of children in the house-
 hold, commuting distance to shopping, recreating,
 and schooling centers), which are not current
 choices.'
 The key household decision or choice variables
 in this study are TM" and Tg, the amount of
 husband's and wife's time supplied to off-farm
 work, but these variables are determined jointly
 with X, Tfm TF (or Q), Thm, Th, and Y. The
 conditions for optimal decisions are obtained by
 maximizing equation (6) subject to resource con-
 straints imposed by equations (1) and (5). Assum-
 ing an interior solution for all choices except Tmi
 the first-order conditions for a constrained maxi-
 mum are:
 X[PqQx W] =0 (7)
 XPqQT yi = O, i=M, F (8)
 Xw'(3) - yi < 0,
 Tm > 0, T (XWI . yi) = 0;
 i=M F (9)
 UTL --yI= 0; i=M, F (10)
 UV - XP, =0O (11)
 T - T; - Tm - Thl = ; i=M, F (12)
 and the budget constraint (5), where y', i = M, F,
 and X are Lagrange multipliers for marginal util-
 ity of husband's and wife's time and income,
 respectively, and UI and Qk are partial derivatives
 of the functions U and Q, respectively.
 Equations (8)-(10) give conditions for optimal
 time allocation by a husband and wife. Both mem-
 bers are assumed to always have positive optimal
 hours of farm and home time; i.e., equations (8)
 and (10) are equalities. Equation (9) provides the
 optimality condition for off-farm work. If WI(8)
 < yi/ then T.* = 0, or optimal hours of off-
 farm work is zero. If W'(8) = y'/X, then an
 individual's off-farm wage, net of commuting cost,
 equals the marginal value of his (her) home time
 or farm labor, and optimal hours of off-farm work
 may be positive.
 When an interior solution for T. occurs, the
 off-farm wage [Wi( 8)] determines the marginal
 value of husband's and wife's time. Equations
 1 In this model, economic outcomes are certain. The intro-
 duction of risk-neutral attitude toward uncertainty into the
 model will not change the predictions of the model.
This content downloaded from 129.186.176.217 on Mon, 05 Dec 2016 14:30:01 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 OFF-FARM WORK DECISIONS OF HUSBANDS AND WIVES 473
 (7)-(9) are then the conditions for profit maximiz-
 ing farm input usage, and they can be solved
 independently of the rest of the equations to ob-
 tain the demand function for farm inputs, includ-
 ing husband's and wife's farm labor:
 Q (= D(WM, WF, W, P, EM, E k)*
 = Tm*, TF *, X*. (13) f 'f
 To obtain the demand functions for husband's
 and wife's home time, equations (5), (10)-(12),
 conditional on (7)-(9), are required:
 = Dh (WM, WF, 77, Py V, EM, EE, r)
 (14)
 where 77 = PqQ* - WX* - WmTM * - W TF f Wf/~
 The off-farm labor-demand functions are derived
 residually. When the husband and wife both work
 off-farm:
 Tm = - Tf *-T*
 Si (WM WF, W, Pq, Py,
 V, EM, EFA,,F ); i = M, F.
 (15)
 This equation is a source of evidence about own-
 wage effects and gross substitution or complemen-
 tariness of husband's and wife's time in farm
 production and consumption.
 When the non-negativity constraint is binding
 for either the husband or wife, the farm pro-
 duction decisions cannot be separated from house-
 hold consumption and labor-supply decisions. Al-
 though off-farm labor supply continues to be de-
 rived residually, T(* and Th* contain the same
 variables. If for individual i, Tm* = 0, then for the
 spouse:
 TJ* = SJ ( Wi, W, Pq, PY, V, E M E F F,),
 j = M, F. (16)
 When the husband does not work for a wage, WM
 is not a determinant of the hours of off-farm work
 of his wife or of any of the other consumption or
 production decisions.
 Selected comparative-static results are summa-
 rized. If home time is a normal good, an increase
 in household other income (V) shifts rightward
 the demand for Th. For an off-farm work partici-
 pant, his (her) farm hours remain unchanged.
 Thus, his (her) off-farm labor-supply curve is
 shifted leftward by an increase in V. If, however,
 the increase in home time is large, T/ * could be
 reduced to zero. For a nonparticipant, increases in
 Th' * are accompanied by an equal reduction
 in I/k.
 The wage elasticity of off-farm hours can be
 positive, negative, or zero. For a wage-work partic-
 ipant and Thi a normal good, an exogenous in-
 crease in the off-farm wage has two opposing
 effects on T,A*. A pure substitution effect, holding
 utility constant, decreases home time, but the in-
 come effect increases demand for home time. Thus,
 these two effects pull in opposite directions on
 off-farm hours. An exogenous rise in the wage rate
 of a wage-work participant is expected to reduce
 his (her) farm hours. For a nonparticipant, a rise
 in the off-farm wage rate increases the probability
 that he (she) becomes an off-farm work partici-
 pant. The expected effects of accumulated human
 capital on off-farm and farm hours are generally a
 priori ambiguous. It may increase the efficiency of
 farm and (or) household production but more
 information is required about the nature of the
 change before predictions can be made. Strong
 effects empirically on farm, off-farm, and home
 hours might, however, be obtained.
 III. The Econometric Model
 The econometric model for husband's and wife's
 off-farm work contains a maximum of four struc-
 tural equations-two labor market demand equa-
 tions and two off-farm labor-supply equations.
 The model is recursive. Each market labor-
 demand equation contains only one endogenous
 variable, and the off-farm labor-supply equations
 contain two or more endogenous variables. This
 four-equation system is modified to permit struc-
 tural changes caused by binding non-negativity
 constraints.
 The econometric model is equations (17)-(19):
 W, = X'13' + vi if W'> WiR;
 i = M, F, (17)
 TM'= WMamA + WFalm? + Zam + M
 if WM> WMR and WF > WFR.
 = WMaAm* + ZaM* + MM*
 if WM? WMR and WF < WFR;
 7m = 0 otherwise. (18)
 T =WMaF + WFaF + Za?F + F,
 if WM> WMR and WF > WFR.
 TF= WFaF* ? ZF* + MF*
 if WM< WMR and WF > WFR.
 TmF = 0 otherwise, (19)
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 where Wi'= hourly market wage rate of i (i =
 M, F); X' vector of personal (ith) and local
 labor market characteristics; WiR = reservation
 wage for i; Z = vector of nonwage variables that
 are exogenous to farm household consumption,
 production, and labor supply decisions; fi, a1kO a
 are unknown parameters; and v1 and ,ll are ran-
 dom disturbance terms.
 The reservation wage for off-farm work of i is
 the marginal value of his (her) time when all of it
 is allocated to farm labor and home time (i.e.,
 T = T? + Th). Given equations (17)-(19), the
 equations for WLR are
 WiR = (1/akk)(Xjijaki + Za' + M1 + via'J),
 (i, j) {(M, F), (F, M)),
 (k, l) = {(1,2), (2,1)). (20)
 Thus, the reservation wage of the wife is a func-
 tion of the exogenous variables and random dis-
 turbance term of her husband's off-farm labor-
 -demand equation and the nonwage exogenous
 variables and random disturbance entering her
 off-farm labor-supply equation.
 The conditional nature of the different lines of
 equations (18)-(19) suggests that switching of
 structures is endogenous. If up and v' are nor-
 mally distributed, then (i = (l/aik)(y' ? v'a',), a
 new random disturbance, is normally distributed.
 Furthermore, F and (M seem likely to be corre-
 lated because they contain common disturbance
 terms and are subjected to the same shocks. In
 this case, the probability of each structure can be
 represented by a bivariate probit model for off-
 farm work participation:
 Pr[wM2 WMR, wF WFR]
 = pl(Ze1M + X19M, ZeF + XF, 8)
 = P1 (21)
 P,[WM > WMR WF < WFR]
 =p2(ZeM j?XeM, ZeFT? XeF,6) =P2( Z1 +X2 1 X2 @6
 = P2 (22)
 Pr[WM < WMR, WF WFR]
 = p3(ZE)j + Xe2Me ZeF + XF, 8 )
 = P3 (23)
 where X contains all the variables of XM and XF,
 except ones included in Z, pj's are bivariate nor-
 mal distribution functions, and 6 is the correla-
 tion coefficient.
 Because of nonrandom econometric structures,
 the conditional mean values of the disturbance
 terms of the market labor demand (Mi and fl*)
 and off-farm labor-supply functions (vi) are po-
 tentially nonzero. If the means are nonzero, sam-
 ple selection bias is a potential problem for equa-
 tions (17)-(19). The potential problems with bias
 can be corrected by creating new variables that are
 conditional means of the disturbance terms and
 adding them to each equation (see Amemiya, 1974,
 p. 1010; Fishe et al., (1981), pp. 180-181).
 The unconditional off-farm labor-supply equa-
 tions are
 Tm = [WMall + WFa[2 + Zam + I/P
 X ( 1151Sll + 'q12S12) ] Pl1
 ?[WMallM* + ZaM*
 + l/P2(q2lS21 + ?q22S22)] P2
 ? EM, where EEM=0 (24)
 T= [WMaFj ? WFaiF~ ?21 22 + ZZ
 + l/p, ( qF Sl1 + qF2l )]P
 ? [W aF2* + Za F*
 + 1/P3 (31S3 32S32 )] P3
 ?E F (25)
 where LE F = 0, and the conditional expectations
 of MM, MM* MF and MF* are
 /1Pl ( qM1S11 + 'q12S12) '
 1/P2(M21S21 + 422S22)
 / l (1 sll + q12S12 )'
 and
 1/P3 ( 31S + 32S32),
 and E' are new random disturbance terms. Each
 expected conditional off-farm labor-supply equa-
 tion has been weighted by its probability of occur-
 rence (see Maddala, 1981).
 Estimation of the multiple-equation endogenous
 switching econometric model (equations (17), (24),
 (25)), modified for sample selectivity, is made eas-
 ier by its recursive structure. The market labor-
 demand equations can be fitted by least squares to
 observations on husbands and wives who partici-
 pate in off-farm work. Although conditional off-
 farm labor-supply equations can be fitted to sub-
 samples of observations that are matched to the
 structures, we choose to fit the unconditional
 equations (24) and (25) to the whole sample. The
 reason is few observations are available for fitting
 some of the structures relative to the number of
 parameters to be estimated and relative to the
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 TABLE 1.-MEANS OF VARIABLES-FARM HOUSEHOLDS AND OFF-FARM WORK, 1976
 Mean (S.D.)
 Both work Husband only Wife only Neither works
 Variables Symbol M F M F M F M F
 A. Endogenous
 Dummy off-farm work status D(OFF)' 1.0 1.0 1.0 0 0 1.0 0 0
 Off-farm labor-annual hours T 1,326 1,127 1,255 0 0 1,085 0 0
 (936) (722) (849) (760)
 Off-farm wage-dollars/hour Wi 5.85 4.59 6.08 - - 7.76 - -
 (3.01) (5.52) (2.88) (20.33)
 B. Exogenous
 Age-years AGE' 41.1 39.2 44.7 42.5 45.3 42.3 49.9 47.0
 (10.6) (10.3) (12.0) (12.4) (11.6) (11.1) (12.9) (13.1)
 Education-yrs. formal E' 12.5 12.5 11.7 11.8 11.8 12.7 11.1 12.0
 schooling (2.1) (1.7) (2.3) (1.7) (2.2) (2.1) (2.2) (1.9)
 Dummy farm raised D(FRAISED)' 0.83 - 0.91 - 0.95 - 0.95 -
 (0.38) (0.28) (0.23) (0.22)
 Asset income ($/yr.) V 3,093 39,486 43,599 39,573
 (302) (225) (213) (167)
 Children: No. 6 yrs. K1 0.20 0.28 0.22 0.27
 (0.55) (0.56) (0.50) (0.62)
 No. 6-11 yrs. K2 0.57 0.67 0.41 0.48
 (0.77) (0.95) (0.73) (0.86)
 No. 12-18 yrs. K3 1.00 0.85 0.67 0.68
 (1.13) (1.12) (1.01) (1.05)
 Distance-miles to MCITY 25.4 26.4 27.0 28.1
 nearest city (17.8) (15.6) (14.4) (13.8)
 Dummy region is West D(WEST) 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.51
 (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
 Length growing season GDD 2,966.7 2,922.0 2,958.9 2,957.9
 (134.2) (150.6) (140.5) (152.1)
 Sample size 60 93 112 506
 number of observations in other structures. Each
 individual i has a nonzero probability of being
 included in any of the four structures, and the
 additional observations can be helpful in identify-
 ing the parameters of the off-farm labor-supply
 equations (Maddala, 1981).2
 IV. The Data and Empirical Results
 The model of off-farm labor supply is to be
 fitted to data for a random sample of Iowa farm
 households collected in 1977.
 The Data
 The data for the analysis were obtained from a
 sample survey of Iowa farms and associated
 households. The population of farms included all
 farms having gross farm sales of $2,500 or more in
 1976. The farm operator was identified as the
 primary decision maker for each farm business.3
 Husband-wife households from this survey pro-
 vide the data for this study; they accounted for
 92% of all survey households. Husbands allocated
 most of their time to farm work, and wives allo-
 cated most of their hours to home time. However,
 65% of the wives reported some annual hours of
 farm work. Off-farm wage work was reported by
 25% of the husbands and 28% of the wives.
 The empirical definitions of the variables and
 summary statistics are reported in table 1. Off-farm
 wage work is measured in annual hours. Age (and
 age squared) control for nonlinear life cycle and
 work experience effects in labor demand functions
 and off-farm labor-supply equations.4 Schooling is
 years of formal schooling completed. Being farm-
 raised reflects early on-the-job training, which may
 affect farming activity choices and opportunities
 2Nelson (1984) has shown that multiple-step estimation pro-
 cedures frequently have relatively low efficiency. Another route
 is to apply maximum likelihood estimation to equations
 (17)-(19). This is, in principle, possible but very expensive.
 3 Interviewers from ISU's Statistics Laboratory completed
 933 questionnaires. The response rate was a relatively high
 88%, and the Statistical Laboratory frequently called back
 households to obtain missing information and to verify infor-
 mation.
 4 Age squared for the husband and wife are highly correlated
 (0.98); so we squared only husband's age.
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 for obtaining land from relatives for farming. As-
 set income is interest on net worth in farmland
 and income from nonfarm assets.
 Two location variables are included. Potential
 commuting distance is defined as the miles from
 the farm to the nearest city having a population ?
 10,000. A dummy variable for location in the
 eastern versus western half of the state is included
 in the labor-demand equations. This variable sum-
 marizes differences in density of industrialization.
 A variable is added to labor-supply equations to
 represent the length of the normal crop-growing
 season, which increases from north to south. A
 longer growing season relaxes the constraint for
 timing of cropping activities and may increase the
 productivity of farm labor.5
 Results
 Off-Farm Work Participation: Bivariate probit
 estimates of the equations explaining off-farm
 work probabilities are reported in table 2. They
 are of direct interest because of insights into hus-
 band's and wife's joint off-farm work decisions
 and for constructing estimates of selection terms
 for the wage and hours equations. Although the
 correlation coefficient for the bivariate probit
 equations is positive, it is not significantly differ-
 ent from zero. Thus, two univariate probit estima-
 tions of the participation equations would also be
 appropriate.
 The results show that the probability of off-farm
 work for husbands is greatest at a young age and
 tends to decline as they become older. For wives,
 there is a slightly concave life-cycle pattern. In-
 creasing the wife's age, holding husband's age
 constant, has a positive and significant effect on
 his probability of off-farm work.
 A husband or wife who has more schooling has
 a significantly greater probability of off-farm work
 than others. This implies that added schooling
 raises an individual's off-farm wage by more than
 it raises their reservation wage at farm and home
 activities. Our results for males are in contrast to
 Sumner's findings for Illinois farmers but in agree-
 ment with Huffman's (1980) results. Additional
 wife's schooling causes a reduction (significant) in
 the probability that her husband works off-farm;
 i.e., raises his reservation wage. Husbands who
 TABLE 2.-BIVARIATE PROBIT EXPLANATION
 OF OFF-FARM WORK STATUS, 1976
 (ASYMPTOTIC t-RATIOS
 IN PARENTHESES, n = 771)
 Husband Wife
 Variables Works Off-farm Works Off-farm
 A GEM -0.045 0.025
 (1.11) (0.64)
 (AGE M)2 -0.025 -0.049
 (0.62) (1.29)
 A GE F 0.050 -0.009
 (3.05) (0.58)
 EM 0.088 0.026
 (3.19) (0.98)
 EF - 0.091 0.080
 (2.96) (2.76)
 D(FRAISEDM) -0.407 -0.186
 (1.82) (0.97)
 K1 -0.256 -0.364
 (2.26) (3.29)
 K2 0.008 - 0.210
 (0.21) (2.89)
 K3 0.043 -0.023
 (0.80) (0.43)
 In V - 0.015 - 0.009
 (1.43) (0.92)
 MCITY - 0.048 - 0.032
 (3.47) (2.39)
 MCITY2 0.071 0.048
 (3.17) (2.22)
 GDD - 0.075 0.003
 (1.92) (0.08)
 8 (correlation coefficient) 0.088
 (t-ratio) (1.47)
 - 2 In (likelihood ratio) 146.5
 have early farming experience have lesser proba-
 bilities of off-farm work than ones raised else-
 where. His early farm background, however, has
 only a weak tendency to reduce his wife's proba-
 bility of off-farm work.
 Children and the growing season affect the pro-
 ductivity of home and farm time. The presence of
 young children (< age 6) reduces the probability
 of a husband and wife working off-farm. Caring
 for young children is, therefore, more compatible
 with farm than off-farm work. Children ages 6-11
 also reduce the probability that a wife works off-
 farm, but there is no effect on husband's off-farm
 work probability. Older children (ages 12-18) do
 not affect either parent's probability of off-farm
 work, suggesting no net effect on the reservation
 wage. A longer crop-growing season, which raises
 the marginal product of farm work, lowers the
 probability that the husband, but not wife, works
 off-farm.
 Larger asset income tends to reduce the proba-
 bility of off-farm work of the husband and wife,
 5Acres operated and farm capital in machinery and livestock
 are excluded from the set of regressors because they are also
 household decision variables.
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 suggesting that home time is a normal good. Farm
 household members that are more isolated from
 jobs have a lower probability of off-farm work.
 Holding the off-farm wage constant, a longer com-
 mute to the nearest city reduces the net wage and
 has the expected negative and significant effect of
 reducing the probability that the husband and
 wife work off-farm. The negative effect of MCITY
 diminishes as distance increases.
 Off-farm Labor-Demand Equations: Off-farm la-
 bor-demand equations for the husband and wife
 (equation 17) with sample selection terms included
 were fitted by least squares to all observations for
 which wage work was reported. The estimates of
 these equations (t-ratios in parentheses under co-
 efficients) are
 ln Wm= 0.769 + 0.059 Em
 (2.03) (2.50)
 + 0.031 EXPm - 0.0007 (EXP M)2
 (2.45) (2.70)
 - 0.127 D( WEST)
 (1.43)
 ? 0.0022 (SI, + S21)
 (0.80)
 + 0.024 (S12 + S22M) ? y M
 (0.29) 1 2
 R2 = 0.27, df= 147; (26)
 In WF= -0.117 + 0.079 EF
 (0.16) (1.65)
 + 0.053 EXPF
 (2.00)
 - 0.0011 (EXP F)2
 (1.97)
 - 0.314 D(WEST)
 (2.00)
 - 0.0016 (SI, + S31)
 (0.31)
 + 0.079 (S12 + S32) + F
 (0.30)
 R= 0.07, df= 166.6 (27)
 These results provide fairly standard education
 and experience effects on loge wage. The results
 do, however, imply that a one-year increase in
 schooling causes a larger percentage (0.079 vs.
 0.059) and absolute (0.44 vs. 0.35) increase for
 wives than for husbands. The results also imply
 that wives' wage-experience profiles are more con-
 cave than for husbands.7 These are unusual
 male-female differences (Smith and Ward, 1984),
 but nonfarm females may spend a larger share of
 their worklife in wage work than farm males.
 Local labor market conditions affect labor de-
 mand. In the western region, males earn 12.7% less
 and females earn 31.4% less than in the east.
 Off-farm Labor-Supply Equations: The uncondi-
 tional off-farm labor supply equations ((24)-(25))
 with sample selection terms included were fitted to
 all 771 sample observations. The wage rates were
 predicted from equations (26) and (27), and the
 probability of a particular conditional structure
 and sample selection variables (Sijs) were derived
 from the bivariate probit estimates presented in
 table 2.
 The off-farm labor supply equations were fitted
 by using Hoerl et al.'s (1975) version of the ridge
 estimator.8 The ridge estimator was pursued be-
 cause of extreme near multicollinearity. This is
 caused by the weighting scheme (same pjs) for all
 variables appearing in each conditional supply
 equation and by appearance of many of the same
 variables in the two conditional supply equations
 composing each unconditional supply equation
 except for different probability weights. Hoerl
 et al.'s (1975) procedure was employed, and stabil-
 ity of the ridge estimator was checked. Estimates
 of the ridge-K were shown to change by less than
 0.1% for each 0.01 increment to K.9 The t-ratios
 reported in table 3 are conditional on the pre-
 dicted wage rates and sample selection terms.
 Other methods of computing t-ratios would give
 different values, perhaps smaller ones.
 The algebraic form of the off-farm labor-supply
 equation is linear in hours and the natural loga-
 rithm of variables in dollar units. This specifica-
 6 The t-ratios are conditional on the predicted Ss. However,
 given that the coefficients of these variables are not individu-
 ally or jointly statistically different from zero, this limitation is
 relatively unimportant. The joint tests resulted in samrple F-val-
 ues of 0.76 and 1.44 for equations (26) and (27); F201525 = 3.07
 7Exp' = AGE' - E' - 6, which is a measure of potential
 experience.
 8 Least-squares estimates are available from the authors upon
 request.
 9 For the model, y = X/ + [, the class of estimators defined
 by 3( K ) = (X'X + KI ) -X'y are called ridge estimators. The
 ridge scalar is K. The ridge estimator frequently has relatively
 good properties when near-multicollinearity is a problem
 (Vinod, 1978; Lin and Kmenta, 1982), but Vinod (1978) con-
 cluded that hypothesis tests may be affected by the bias of the
 estimator. The stability of the estimator is quite useful for
 estimating marginal effects.
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 TABLE 3.-"Two STAGE" RIDGE-REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF UNCONDITIONAL
 OFF-FARM LABOR SUPPLY EQUATIONS, 1976
 (PSEUDO t-RATIOS IN PARENTHESES, n = 771)
 Husband's Hoursa Wife's Hoursa
 Variables Both work Husband only Both work Wife only
 In WM 121.39b 47.41 51.01 -
 (7.02) (1.18) (4.11)
 In WF 105.86 - 61.03 - 129.22
 (2.66) (2.33) (1.78)
 AGEM 0.545 0.782 0.108 -1.083
 (0.74) (0.75) (0.19) (1.36)
 (A GE M )2 -0.085 -0.020 -0.034 -0.030
 (2.90) (0.65) (1.57) (1.42)
 A GE F 1.062 2.015 0.607 -0.295
 (1.15) (1.60) (0.92) (0.33)
 EM 17.186 2.687 7.383 0.564
 (4.79) (0.380) (3.01) (0.11)
 E F 7.505 - 2.713 12.140 - 9.212
 (2.36) (0.34) (5.44) (1.87)
 D(FRAISED M) -178.15 71.34 71.52 21.03
 (2.23) (0.67) (1.18) (0.28)
 K1 - 61.58 391.65 - 126.66 52.67
 (0.49) (4.04) (1.28) (0.70)
 K, 75.72 -19.78 - 69.25 - 8.06
 (1.29) (0.38) (1.48) (0.20)
 K3 64.73 59.01 -13.72 - 2.81
 (1.76) (1.22) (0.48) (0.07)
 MCITY -1.890 - 1.974 1.293 0.230
 (1.44) (0.84) (1.27) (0.13)
 MCITY2 - 0.028 0.006 -0.007 -0.051
 (1.17) (0.10) (0.36) (1.06)
 In V 3.014 5.473 - 7.785 - 8.622
 (0.46) (0.54) (1.57) (1.11)
 GDD 0.074 0.049 0.039 0.003
 (5.40) (2.22) (4.13) (0.19)
 Si1 -0.64 x 10-3 -1.00 X 10-3
 (0.70) (1.45)
 S12 - 0.16 x 10- 0.25 x 10-
 (0.71) (1.46)
 S21 0.23 x 10-3
 (0.27)
 S2 2 0.22 x 10-3
 (1.17)
 S31 -0.14 x 10-
 (1.13)
 S32 0.94 x 10-4
 (0.36)
 Intercept -4.102 252.94
 (0.08) (5.28)
 R 0.14 0.09
 Ridge K 0.30 0.44
 'Each of the variables except for the selection terms (Ss) are weighted by a probability, pi, i = 1. 2 or 3.
 bI-ratios are conditional on predicted values of wage rates and selection variables.
 tion has been used by others; e.g., Schultz (1980).
 It performed marginally better here than one with
 log hours, and it has the reasonable implication
 that the wage elasticity of off-farm labor supply
 decreases as off-farm hours increase. The most
 significant result presented in table 3 is the evi-
 dence that the economic structures are different
 when inequality constraints are encountered. A
 joint test of equality of all coefficients variable-
 by-variable appearing in the two structures, except
 for wage and sample selection terms, was rejected
 at the 1% significance level.10 Thus, earlier off-
 10 The sample F-values are 2.96 and 3.12 for the joint tests in
 the husbands and wife's equations; Fi35737 = 1.77.
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 farm labor-supply studies (e.g., Sumner, 1982;
 Rosenzweig, 1980) that failed to take account of
 this heterogeneity contained potentially serious
 specification errors.
 Own-wage elasticities are larger when both
 adults work off-farm than when only one works.
 Evaluated at the subsample means, the own-wage
 off-farm labor-supply elasticity for husbands is
 0.091 when the husband and wife both work off-
 farm and 0.038 when only he works off-farm. For
 wives, the own-wage labor-supply elasticities are
 0.054 when they both work off-farm and -0.119
 when only she works off-farm.11 Our wage elastici-
 ties for husbands or farm operators are substan-
 tially smaller than Sumner (1982) obtained.
 Cross-wage elasticity estimates show that hus-
 band's and wife's time are gross complements.
 Asset-income effects on female off-farm labor sup-
 ply are negative, implying that female home time
 is a normal good. Although these results are statis-
 tically weak, they are stronger than the asset-
 income effects on male off-farm labor supply.
 The effects of education differ by structure.
 When the husband and wife both work off-farm,
 all the own- and cross-person education effects are
 positive and significant. However, when only the
 husband works, neither education coefficient has a
 significant effect. When only the wife works off-
 farm, the sign of the coefficient on her education
 becomes negative in her off-farm hours equation,
 and her spouse's education has no significant
 effect.
 Children and growing season affect off-farm
 hours differently than participation. When the
 husband and wife work off-farm, additional young
 (< age 6) children tend to reduce off-farm hours,
 but the effect is statistically weak. When only one
 of the parents works off-farm, additional young
 children tend to increase off-farm hours. Off-farm
 hours by wives tend to be reduced by a larger
 number of children ages 6-11 and ages 12-18. A
 longer crop-growing season increases husband's
 off-farm hours. When off-farm work occurs, the
 longer season seems to facilitate flexibility of farm
 work, leaving more time for off-farm work.
 Other effects follow: A slightly concave life-cycle
 profile of hours exists except when only the wife
 works off-farm. MCITY has its effects primarily
 on probability of participation and not on hours,
 given participation. Sample selection terms (Sijs)
 are not individually or jointly significantly differ-
 ent from zero."2
 V. Implications
 Multiple binding non-negativity constraints are
 reasonably common phenomena. They may arise
 whenever joint decisions are being made by eco-
 nomic agents. In agriculture, farmers make deci-
 sions on multiple outputs, and in a sample of
 farms, a significant share of them will be against
 non-negativity constraints for two or more out-
 puts. In nonfarm households, multiple binding
 non-negativity constraints occur when husband's
 and wife's labor-supply decisions are considered
 jointly with demand decisions for goods. These
 complexities are, however, seldom explicitly incor-
 porated into econometric models.
 Our experience may be useful to others. We
 encountered several problems when we imple-
 mented an econometric model adapted for two
 binding non-negativity constraints. When condi-
 tional off-farm supply equations were fitted by
 least squares to subsamples, some subsample sizes
 were small, and t-ratios for estimated coefficients
 were generally small. When an unconditional sup-
 ply equation was adopted, it suffered from near-
 multicollinearity. Finally, a maximum likelihood
 estimator for the system is expensive to obtain.
 IThese are all problems that other researchers might
 expect to encounter when they attempt to econo-
 metrically model multiple binding non-negativity
 constraints.
 11 An estimate of the unconditional population response of
 husband's off-farm labor supply to a one-unit change in 4j is
 .1 + P2ae,
 12 The sample F-values are 0.73 and 1.12 for the joint tests in
 the husband's and wife's equations; F4?7'37 = 2.39.
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